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Top Tens in 2011: 
Patent and Trademark Cases 
By Stephen McJohn* 
I. PATENT 
¶1  The leading development in patent law was the enactment of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act of 2011.1  The Act made a number of significant changes in U.S. 
patent law, such as moving U.S. law closer to most international jurisdictions by shifting 
to a first-to-file rule for determining priority between competing inventors, instead of 
first-to-invent;2 broadening prior user rights; nullifying the best mode requirement; 
adopting a supplemental examination procedure, to cure defects in an applicants’ 
submissions of prior art; adding a post-grant opposition procedure; and barring patents 
encompassing centaurs or tax strategies.  As to patent reform, meatier issues were 
addressed by a number of judicial decisions, on such issues as the scope of patent subject 
matter, challenges to the validity of patents, and the breadth of patent protection. 
 
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law.  This listing and analysis are decidedly subjective, 
and all the usual disclaimers apply.  Thanks to Heidi Harvey and Joseph Koipally.  Comments welcome:  
smcjohn@suffolk.edu. 
1 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No 112-29, 125 Stat. 284–341 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 2–376).  For a clear guide to a complex statute, see Mark A. Lemley, Things You Should Care About in 
the New Patent Statute (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1929044, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1929044. 
2 The first-to-invent rules will continue to apply to existing patents and to applications filed until March 17, 
2013.  The new system might have given a different result in litigation over patent rights to Crestor, a 
widely sold pharmaceutical. See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Astrazeneca Pharm. Indus. LP, 661 F.3d 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Teva’s patent invalidated by Astrazeneca’s prior invention date). 




1. Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Myriad) 
 3 
¶2  In a case testing the limits of patentable subject matter, the question was whether 
human genes are patentable.  Human genes are not patentable in the form in which they 
appear in the body, the Federal Circuit stated, because that is a non-patentable “product 
of nature.”  But the court held a patent may issue for genes that have been identified and 
isolated: 
Native DNA exists in the body as one of forty-six large, contiguous DNA 
molecules.  Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger structural 
complex, a chromosome. . . .  Isolated DNA, in contrast, is a free-standing 
portion of a native DNA molecule, frequently a single gene.  Isolated DNA has 
been cleaved . . . or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally 
occurring DNA molecule.4 
Accordingly, the court upheld Myriad Genetics’ patents on isolated BRCA1 DNA and 
isolated BRCA2 DNA, two mutations of human DNA linked to higher probability of 
breast and ovarian cancer. 
¶3  The decision also considered process claims related to the genes.  The court held 
that claims on methods of “‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ two gene sequences” were outside 
patentable subject matter, because they claimed only “abstract mental processes.”5  The 
court, however, upheld a claim on “a method for screening potential cancer 
therapeutics.”6  That claim was patentable, because it had the concrete steps of “growing” 
host cells, determining their growth rate by manipulating the cells. 
¶4  The method claim analysis has importance well beyond the issues of the 
patentability of genes.  Whether genes are patentable is important for practical reasons 
 
3 17Q-Linked Breast & Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene, U.S. Patent 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).  To 
Dennis Crouch’s PATENTLY-O, http://www.patentlyo.com, I owe the practice of illustrating patent law 
cases with relevant patent drawings. 
4 Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1351. 
5 Id. at 1355. 
6 Id. at 1357–58. 
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(there are thousands of patents on genes) and for theoretical reasons (it triggers questions 
from philosophy to economics).  The process claims may be of more practical 
importance, because the patentability of processes arises in biotech, but also in many 
other areas, such as business methods, and software—and software can be in every field.  
Some abstract software patents are likely to be called into question, if they appear to 
claim only “abstract mental processes.”  Where the software has a specific concrete 
application, it may fall into the second category, making it patentable. 
7 
¶5  Not long after Myriad, the Federal Circuit indeed held a software patent invalid, as 
claiming an invention that was merely a set of mental steps.8  Likewise, medical 
diagnostic procedures and other biotech inventions may be either abstract or concrete.  
The importance of Myriad, however, will become clearer if and when the Supreme Court 
disposes of Prometheus,9 now pending before the Supreme Court, which deals with the 
patentability of a diagnostic procedure. 
¶6  The 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act provided a specific limitation on 
patentable subject matter in life sciences:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”10  The 
provision would bar patents on genetically altered humans and cloned humans, and very 
likely chimeras combining humans and other species (not that any actual inventions were 
in sight as of the date of the statute).  Read broadly, the provision could apply to human 
stem cell methods or products, or even other inventions involving human cells.  Because 
“directed to” and “encompassing” are not defined terms, it could in theory be read very 
broadly indeed.  Any method of medical treatment, fitness program, or weight loss 
method is directed to a human organism, in a sense, especially if the effects on the subject 
range throughout the body.  “Encompassing a human organism,” literally, could 
encompass a game of Ring a Ring o’ Roses.  The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), however, soon stated its view that the provision simply codified 
 
7 U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154 (filed July 28, 1997). 
8 See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).   
9 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
3027 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (No. 10–1150). 
10 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).  This provision, 
counterparts of which had been including in previous budget legislation, was not codified into the Patent 
Act.  




existing USPTO policy.11  Although that policy has likewise not been set out in detail, the 
USPTO has issued many patents on human genes (hence Myriad), human cells, and other 
human biotech inventions; so, such patents will continue to issue, unless the courts read 
the patent statute otherwise. 
¶7  The 2011 patent legislation also effectively barred statutes on “any strategy for 
reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability.”12  The section provides that it does not bar 
patents on methods or computerized systems for preparing tax returns or for financial 
management (not that such business methods are necessarily patentable, the section 
further provides). 
2. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) 
13 
¶8  A patent should not issue if the claimed invention is not new.  But showing that 
something had been done before is not always easy.  With software patents especially, it 
may be difficult to find code (which is often not widely available) that prefigures a 
subsequent patent.  Something that complicates the issue is that once the patent is issued, 
it is presumed valid, and can only be invalidated with “clear and convincing” evidence.  
That gives a lot of leverage to patent holders.  When an inventor applies for a patent, the 
examiner must decide if the invention has already been sold or commercially used in the 
United States or published anywhere in the world.  The examiner, however, has limited 
resources to look for all those possible references.  
¶9  Microsoft argued that the standard should be adjusted.  Where a party presented 
evidence that had not been considered by the patent examiner, a court could use the 
general “preponderance” standard:  if it was more likely than not that the patent was 
wrongly issued, it would be held invalid.  In patent litigation, parties often uncover 
 
11 Memorandum from Robert Bahr, Senior Patent Counsel, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent 
Examining Corps (Sept. 20, 2011) (stating that “section 33(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
codifies existing USPTO policy that human organisms are not patent-eligible subject matter”).  
12 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 14.  This provision was also not codified into the Patent Act. 
13 U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (filed June 2, 1994). 
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relevant references not considered during the application process.  Compared to a single 
examiner, a patent defendant has much greater incentives, as millions of dollars may be at 
stake, and resources to research whether the invention was truly new.  The Supreme 
Court, however, declined to depart from the existing standard, leaving it to Congress to 
change the patent statute if it so chose.  Notably, Congress did not make this reform in 
the 2011 patent legislation. 
3. Global-Tech. Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) 
14 
¶10  The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of when a party may be liable for 
infringement by someone else.  Pentalpha copied an SEB deep fryer, whose cool-touch 
technology was a commercial success.  Pentalpha then had an attorney analyze whether 
Pentalpha’s fryer infringed any patents—but without informing the attorney that the fryer 
was made by copying SEB’s fryer.  Pentalpha exported the fryer to various retailers.  The 
retailers infringed by selling the fryer.  The question was whether Pentalpha was 
secondarily liable for causing them to sell the infringing fryer.  
¶11  When should one be liable for infringement by another?  The patent statute requires 
knowledge of the infringement for secondary liability.15  In Global-Tech Appliances, the 
Supreme Court held that “willful blindness” to infringement is sufficient to meet the 
knowledge requirement.  Pentalpha did not know that its fryer infringed the SEB fryer.  
Indeed, its attorney had not discovered any patents that that the Pentalpha fryer infringed.  
But had the attorney been advised that the fryer was copied from SEB, it’s much more 
likely the attorney would have looked at the SEB patent and advised otherwise.  After 
deliberately insulating itself from knowledge of patent infringement, Pentalpha could  not 
argue that lack of knowledge protected it from infringement liability. 
¶12  An ironic footnote:  a premise of the Court’s analysis is that simply asking an 
attorney to examine a product and compare it to the data base of existing patents is not a 
dependable way to see if a product is likely to infringe a patent.  In other words, the Court 
assumes that patents do not provide much notice to potential infringers (whether willfully 
blind, as Pentalpha was in Global-Tech Appliances, or innocent, as in the typical case). 
 
14 U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312 (filed Aug. 28, 1990). 
15 35 U.S. 271(b) (2006). 




4. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular 
Systems, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011) 
16 
¶13  The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has led to considerable commercial development of 
university research.  The Act sets up a framework, under which universities may elect to 
patent inventions made through federally funded research, or may allow the researchers 
to seek patents on the inventions.  The narrow issue in Board of Trustees of the Leland 
Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems was whether the patent rights 
vest automatically in the university, or only after the researcher makes the required 
assignment of patent rights.  The Supreme Court held that the general rule in patent law 
applies:  the inventor initially has the right to patent, which passes only after an effective 
assignment has been made (even if, as in Bayh-Dole, the inventor is required to make that 
assignment). 
¶14  The Court did not address a broader issue of patent licensing that arose in the case.  
Courts differentiate between an agreement assigning patent rights and a promise to assign 
patent rights.  The latter does not actually assign the rights; a second agreement actually 
assigning the rights must be executed.  Some have questioned whether that accurately 
reflects patent law’s historical approach or the intent of the parties.  It is rare that the 
parties would intend anything other than an assignment of the rights effective at the time 
the initial agreement is made, as opposed to a commitment to sit down again later and 
sign the rights over.  So, drafting licensing agreements retains that trap for the unwary.  
 
16 U.S. Patent No. 5,968,730 (filed June 6, 1995). 
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5. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) 
17 
¶15  A patent applicant is not required to search to see if her invention is new and 
nonobvious, and is not required to submit information on the relevant technology to the 
patent office.  But she does have a duty to submit information on whatever relevant 
technology she is aware of.  If the applicant fails to do so, the patent may be held 
unenforceable.  Therasense addressed the consequences of failing to disclose.  A 
meandering line of cases had set confusing standards on the issue of when a patent would 
be unenforceable due to failure to disclose.  Some cases have held patents unenforceable, 
even where the non-disclosed information would have had little effect or the failure to 
disclose reflected little intent to mislead the USPTO.  The majority of defendants in 
patent litigation raised inequitable conduct as a defense.18 
¶16  The en banc court raised the bar:  “This court now tightens the standards for finding 
both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the 
detriment of the public.”19  The court set high standards of proof for both the applicant’s 
state of mind and the materiality of the non-disclosed material.  As to state of mind, “the 
accused infringer must prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the 
[US]PTO.”20  The nondisclosure must also generally involve highly relevant information, 
such that the “[US]PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the 
undisclosed prior art.”21  Given those high standards, inequitable conduct is now a much 
less promising defense.  Indeed, in most cases, it would require showing prior art that 
would invalidate the patent anyway for obviousness or lack of novelty.  The 2011 patent 
statute provided for a supplemental examination procedure, in which a patentee could 
submit material that had not been submitted during prosecution of the patent and thereby 
 
17 Strip Electrode with Screen Printing, U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (filed Oct. 13, 1998). 
18 Ad Hoc Comm. on Rule 56 and Inequitable Conduct, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n , The Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of Candor in Patent Procurement (cited in Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288, 
for its finding that eighty percent of patent cases involve allegations of inequitable misconduct). 
19 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1291. 




not be subject to a finding of inequitable conduct.22  Given that Therasense moots most 
such cases, the supplemental examination will be less important strategically, but still 
provides a procedure to clear the record. 
6. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
23 
¶17  The written description requirement acts as a safeguard against overbroad claims.  
It also serves to balance the timing issues of patent prosecution.  A patent applicant must 
provide a written description of the invention, as well as claims that define the invention.  
The applicant may amend the claims during the process of patent prosecution.  That way, 
if the USPTO denies the application because the claims are too broad or otherwise 
defective, the applicant may amend the claims in order to receive a patent.  Otherwise, 
deserving inventors might be denied patents simply because they did not draft claims that 
were deemed acceptable.  But the ability to amend claims raises some hazards.  An 
applicant may amend claims in order to cover the processes or products of others that 
became public after the application was filed.  At its extreme, “submarine patenting” 
involved amending patent applications decades after they were filed, to cover after-
developed technology.24  But less dramatic cases also show the hazards of amending 
claims.  Centocor filed a patent application on a pharmaceutical, a mouse antibody 
targeted at treating arthritis.  Abbott, a competitor, subsequently marketed a 
pharmaceutical for treating arthritis, based on a similar human antibody.  Centocor 
amended its patent claims in the pending application to cover human antibodies, obtained 
a patent, and sued for infringement.  A jury awarded $1.67 billion in damages. 
 
22 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Public L. No 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat. 284, 325 (2011) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 257 (2011)). 
23 U.S. Patent 7,070,775 (filed July 18, 2002). 
24 “Submarine patenting” refers to the tactic of an applicant deliberately delaying the issuance of a patent, 
meanwhile amending its claims, in order to cover technology developed after the patent application was 
filed.  The practice is now less likely for two reasons. See STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (3rd ed. 2009).  First, for applications filed after 1995, the patent term 
starts running from the application date.  Second, the Federal Circuit began to apply the doctrine of 
prosecution estoppels, which would bar enforcement of a patent, where unreasonable delay was shown in 
prosecution of the application. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med. 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
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¶18  The Federal Circuit overturned the award, reasoning that the claims were invalid, as 
not supported by the written description.  The written description requirement applies to 
the application as of the date of application.  It therefore acts as a limitation on an 
applicant’s ability to amend the claims during the application.  Centocor did not meet the 
written description requirement for a human antibody by identifying the properties of a 
mouse antibody in the application, even if it did disclose that the method might 
subsequently be developed to produce a human antibody.  Accordingly, the description 
did not support the subsequent amendment to the claims in the patent application. 
¶19  Other notable cases in 2011 turned on the written description requirement.  Johnson 
and Johnson patents (like Centocor’s, with claims amended long after the filing of the 
application) were invalidated as failing to describe the claimed angioplasty stents.25  A 
patent on method for detecting genetic mutations related to iron absorption disorders was 
held to merely describe a “research plan” as of the filing date, as opposed to supporting 
the claimed diagnostic method.26  By contrast, a patent for an improved form of soda can 
survived an invalidity challenge, even though it did not address all the technical 
challenges described in the application.27 
 
25 See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
.  
U.S. Patent No. 7,217,286 (filed Aug. 24, 2006). 
26 See Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 642 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
see also Jason Rantanen, Billups-Rothenberg v. ARUP: The Dangers of Filing Too Early . . . or Too Late, 
PATENTLY-O (May 3, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/05/billups-rothenberg-v-arup-dont-
file-too-earlyor-too-late.html (showing how races to develop a new technology may lead to inventors filing 
too soon (because they cannot yet sufficiently describe the invention) or too late (because others have 
gained patent rights or publicly disclosed the invention, making it unpatentable)). 
27 See Crown Packaging Tech. Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 .  
U.S. Patent No. 6,848,875 (filed Dec. 18, 2001). 




7. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
28 
¶20  The Federal Circuit affirmed sanctions for baseless patent litigation.  Eon-Net filed 
a baseless case, failed to make a reasonable pre-suit investigation, destroyed evidence 
before filing the suit, and engaged in obstructive conduct during the case.  The court also 
took into account that the party was simply seeking licensing revenue and was not an 
active participant in the market—because such a party would be affected by the 
uncertainties of litigation.  The court also noted that Eon-Net had filed numerous suits 
and settled for small fractions of the likely cost of litigation, indicating that it might have 
little confidence in the validity of the claims.  Eon-Net makes it a little more risky to try 
to enforce patents beyond their scope. 
¶21  On the topic of professional responsibility:  a question for 2012 will be where to 
litigate legal malpractice claims involving patents.  The Federal Circuit signaled that it 
may reconsider whether federal courts can hear such cases.  The Texas Supreme Court, 
meanwhile, held that state courts cannot, potentially leaving such cases vagabond.29 
 
 
28 U.S. Patent No. 6,683,697 (filed Dec. 9, 1999). 
29 Compare Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans LLP, No. 2011-1012, 2011 WL 5600640 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 
2011) (stating in dicta that “we believe this court should re-evaluate the question of whether jurisdiction 
exists to entertain a state law malpractice claim involving the validity of a hypothetical patent, ” in case 
where inventor argued that law firm “was negligent in failing to secure broader patent protection for his 
invention”) with Minton v. Gunn, No. 10-0141, 2011 WL 6276121 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011) (holding that 
“federal courts possess exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that 
require the application of federal patent law,” in case where plaintiff alleged that “negligent failure to 
timely plead and brief the experimental use exception to the on-sale bar cost him the opportunity of 
winning his federal patent infringement litigation”). 
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8. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. 
Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
30 
¶22  The claims of a patent define the scope of the rights in the invention.  If the claims 
are indefinite, they fail to give others notice of what products or processes would infringe 
the patent.  Software patents have often been criticized as having claims that are too 
abstract, that could read on software far from the actual invention.31  Aoyama invalidated 
a software patent for failing to provide sufficient description of the claimed invention.  
Specifically, a flow chart that described part of the process at a high level did not provide 
sufficient structure to describe the means included in the patent claim.  By contrast, 
Typhoon Touch held a claim for a portable, keyboardless computer provided sufficient 
structure, where the algorithm for the claimed method was described in prose in the 
written description.  Along those lines, in Star Scientific, a patent on a process for curing 
tobacco was not indefinite, even though it did not provide numerical values for several 
variables used in the process.32  Rather, because tobacco curing is “more of an art than a 
science,”33 the court reasoned that one skilled in the art would have sufficient information 
to implement the method. 
 
30 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2001/0034673 (filed Feb. 21, 2001). 
31 See generally, JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
32 Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1374.  
33 Id. at 1380 (Dyk, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part). 




9. Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc., 626 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) 
¶23  A claimed invention is not patentable if it was obvious in light of the prior art—
existing relevant known technology.  Much technology is being adapted for online use.  
Western Union held it obvious to simply adapt funds transfer system using telephones 
and faxes to an Internet implementation.  Innovention looked in the opposite direction.  In 
defining the relevant technology to assess the obviousness of a board game, electronic 
versions of similar games were held to be analogous technology, included within the 
obviousness analysis. 
34 
10. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
¶24  The Federal Circuit in Uniloc rejected the twenty-five percent “rule of thumb,” as a 
presumptive measure of the percentage of an infringer's profits to be awarded as damage, 
as “a fundamentally flawed tool.”35  Especially in computer technology, where a product 
may touch on thousands of patents, rules geared toward the actual damages work better 
than automatic rules. 
II. PATENT PENDING 
• Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011), took the following question on 
review: 
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that covers observed 
correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim 
effectively preempts all uses of the naturally occurring correlations, simply 
because well-known methods used to administer prescription drugs and test 
blood may involve ‘transformations’ of body chemistry. 
• Kappos v. Hyatt, 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 
(2011) (whether patent applicant, appealing denial of patent, may introduce new 
evidence in district court). 
 
34 U.S. Patent No. 6,488,203 (filed Oct. 26, 1999). 
35 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315. 
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• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011) (whether generic drug manufacturer 
may file counterclaim seeking correction of patent information). 
III. PENDING EN BANC BEFORE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: 
• Akamai Technologies v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 419 F. App’x. 989 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
• McKesson Technologies v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 WL 2173401 
(Fed. Cir. May 26, 2011) (whether actions of multiple parties, taken together, may 
infringe patent). 
IV. TRADEMARK 
¶25  Trademark cases tested the borders of trademark protection—distinctiveness and 
functionality, along with the interplay between trademark law and other areas of the law, 
such as the First Amendment, products liability, and Internet domain name ownership. 
1. Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 933 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) 
36 
¶26  Lou v. Otis Elevator is not strictly a trademark law case, nor was it decided in 2011.  
But it reminds trademark owners and plaintiff’s lawyers of a doctrine with considerable 
practical importance, under which trademark licensors may be liable for defective 
products sold by licensees.  Under the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine, the trademark 
owner may be liable for injuries caused by goods bearing its licensed mark, provided it 
participated substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the products.  Otis 
Elevator Company was liable for injuries caused by an escalator made by an overseas 
joint venture, where Otis Elevator provided its marks and technology under a license.  In 
an era when licensing transactions are increasingly common, trademark owners 
 
36 U.S. Patent No. 248,562 (filed Apr. 8, 1881). 




frequently rely on manufacturers who can produce the goods at lower costs, sometimes in 
other jurisdictions.  Trademark owners should know that a licensing transaction is not 
simply a one-way agreement that brings in revenue.  It also brings in legal risks 
analogous to those that the trademark owner would have if it manufactured the goods 
itself—legal risks created by products liability, breach of warranty, and consumer 
protection law.  In short, a trademark owner is not able to simply take the benefits of 
commercializing a symbol on which consumers rely without taking responsibility for 
how that symbol is used to communicate with consumers. 
2. Eva's Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2011) 
37 
¶27  A trademark is a symbol that distinguishes one source of goods and services.  A 
trademark owner may license use of the mark to others, but must maintain some control 
over the use of the mark.  Otherwise, the symbol will not act as a source-identifier.  
Courts have been extremely forgiving, however, in analyzing whether a trademark holder 
has abandoned the mark by failing to control its use.  Eva’s Bridal represents a rare 
decision finding abandonment.  The licensor exercised no control at all over how the 
licensee used the mark.  The licensor did not control the marketing of goods or 
appearance of the retail operation.  Accordingly, the trademark owner could not recover 
unpaid licensing royalties. 
3. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 
2011) 
¶28  A symbol that merely describes goods or services is not protectable as a trademark, 
unless such trademark obtains secondary meaning.  Because a mark is “merely 
descriptive,” prospective buyers may not regard it as a source-identifying symbol.  More 
importantly, if one competitor held a trademark on a merely descriptive term, that would 
limit the ability of other competitors to describe their wares to prospective buyers.  The 
store of potential trademark symbols is infinite, so there is little cost in denying 
trademark protection to merely descriptive symbols.  Fair Isaac held that “300-850” was 
merely descriptive of the relevant credit-scoring business, and therefore was not 
protectable as a mark. 
 
37 Peasant Wedding Procession, Peter Brueghel the Younger (1564-1637). 
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4. Georgia–Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 647 F.3d 723 (7th 
Cir. 2011) 
38 
¶29  Even a distinctive symbol may not be a trademark, if it is functional.  This rule 
polices the boundary between trademark and patent.  Functional matter may be protected 
only subject to patent’s high requirements for protection and limited duration.  Georgia–
Pacific held that a “Quilted Diamond Design” used on toilet paper was functional.39  In 
reaching that decision, the court relied on several related patents held by the trademark 
owner, which discussed the functional advantages of the design:  “Thus, reading the 
language of the patents, we find that the ‘central advance’ claimed in the utility patents is 
embossing a quilt-like diamond lattice filled with signature designs that improves 
(perceived) softness and bulk, and reduces nesting and ridging.”40 
5. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) 
¶30  Testing the bounds of the functionality doctrine, the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
doctrine of “aesthetic functionality.”41  Broadly applied, that would allow others to use a 
trademark where the trademark itself was something consumers sought.  Perhaps anyone 
could sell Chicago Cubs hats, where consumers regard “Chicago Cubs” as a product 
feature.  The court shortly thereafter withdrew the opinion and resolved the case on 
narrower grounds,42 leaving trademark lawyers feeling, as one practitioner put it to me, 
“like almost getting hit by a bus or something!” 
 
6. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2011) 
¶31  TrafficSchool.com represents an increasing attention among courts to the 
restrictions on free speech arising from remedies for intellectual property infringement.  
Courts in copyright cases have become less ready to grant injunctions against infringers, 
where damages are available to redress harms, because of the speech-inhibiting effect of 
injunctions.  In TrafficSchool.com, the trial court had ordered a web site to display a 
 
38 Georgia–Pacific, 647 F.3d at 726. 
39 Id. at 732. 
40 Id. at 729. 
41 Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124.  
42 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 




disclaimer to all users.  The appellate court directed the trial court to properly consider 
the burden on speech. 
7. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2011) 
¶32  Trademark law has proven quite resilient, using long-established doctrine to handle 
the novel fact patterns generated by online communication and technology.  Network 
Automation shows that the same basic concerns arise online as in reality.  The mark 
holder had sued a competitor for using its mark for keyword advertising with Google.  An 
influential early case, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment 
Corp.,43 had identified three factors as key in the Internet context for determining if there 
was the requisite likelihood of confusion for trademark infringement:  how similar the 
marks are, how related the goods are, and whether both companies use the Internet as a 
marketing channel.  The trial court focused on those factors in finding infringement.  The 
appellate court, however, held that the court should apply the same factors as in 
infringement cases generally, in a flexible manner. 
8. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 
2011) 
  44 
¶33  After almost disappearing in wake of Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.45 (in 
which the Supreme Court considerably narrowed its scope), the dilution cause of action 
has made a considerable comeback.  Congress reacted to Moseley by lowering the proof 
requirement,46 and courts have broadly applied dilution.  Levi Strauss continues that 
trend.  In a change from previous dilution law, the court held that a junior mark need not 
be “identical or nearly identical” to the senior mark to give rise to dilution.  The court 
reasoned that in amending the dilution statue to make proof of dilution easier, Congress 
also implicitly broadened dilution to reach marks that are not nearly identical to the 
plaintiff’s famous mark.  Dilution, a broad protection given to famous marks, becomes a 
 
43 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
44 Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1175–76. 
45 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
46 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
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more useful tool.  In practical terms, that means that businesses of every type may be well 
advised to think thrice before using symbols that are at all similar to famous marks—a 
troubling effect on speech. 
9. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 
2011) 
¶34  Often, a registered domain name is uncomfortably similar to a trademark.  The 
trademark owner has two legal avenues:  arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, in which the trademark owner seeks to have the domain 
handed over; and litigation under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, in 
which the trademark owner seeks the domain and a monetary award.  There are many 
reasons a domain might resemble a trademark (coincidence, comment, parody, prior use, 
etc.), so both procedures require the complainant to show bad faith.  Newport News 
shows that the two are not mutually exclusive. 
¶35  Newport News, a women’s clothing line, pursued an arbitration proceeding, 
seeking the domain Newportnews.com, which was used for news in the Newport News, 
Virginia area.  The arbitration panel found no bad faith, given the dissimilarity between 
the two markets (clothing and news).  In following years, Newportnews.com, while 
offering to sell the domain to Newport News, shifted its focus from news to women’s 
clothing.  The court found bad faith and awarded damages and attorney’s fees.  Newport 
News shows that winning the right to retain a domain does not give carte blanche for use 
of that domain. 
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